Email communication is encumbered with a mass of email messages which their recipients have neither requested nor require. Even worse, the impacts of these messages are far from being simply an annoyance, as they also involve economic damage. This manuscript examines the resource "email addresses", which is vital for any potential bulk mailer and spammer. Both a methodology and a honeypot conceptualization for implementing an empirical analysis of the usage of email addresses placed on the Internet are proposed here. Their objective is to assess, on a quantitative basis, the extent of the current harassment and its development over time. This "framework" is intended to be extensible to measuring the effectiveness of address-obscuring techniques. The implementation of a pilot honeypot is described, which led to key findings, some of them being: (1) Web placements attract more than two-thirds (70%) of all honeypot spam emails, followed by newsgroup placements (28.6%) and newsletter subscriptions (1.4%), (2) the proportions of spam relating to the email addresses' top-level domain can be statistically assumed to be uniformly distributed, (3) More than 43% of addresses on the web have been abused, whereas about 27% was the case for addresses on newsgroups and only about 4% was the case for addresses used for a newsletter subscription, (4) Regarding the development of email addresses' attractiveness for spammers over time, the service "web sites" features a negative linear relationship, whereas the service "Usenet" shows a negative exponential relationship. (5) Only 1.54% of the spam emails showed an interrelation between the topic of the spam email and that of the location where the recipient's address was placed, so that spammers are assumed to send their emails in a "context insensitive" manner. The results of the empirical analysis motivate the need for the protection of email addresses through obscuration. We analyze this need by formulating requirements for address obscuring techniques and we reveal to which extent today's most relevant approaches fulfill these requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
ITH the usage of the term "spam", the Internet community seemingly describes in consensus the ubiquitous phenomenon of receiving unsolicited bulk email (UBE), as specified in [1] . Although this might suggest a precise and full apprehending of this kind of Internet abuse, different semantics of the terms "unsolicited" and "bulk" can, however, be found [2] . Furthermore, definition refinements and specializations lead to divergent ontologies. For example, spam is (either implicitly or explicitly) associated with a commercial context and is then referred to as unsolicited commercial email (UCE) [3] , thereby excluding many other possible forms of appearance such as fraud emails, phishing emails and chain letters. Many legislative and regulative activities against UBE have resulted in laws and policies which are mainly dedicated to UCE (e.g. the German UWG [4] , the U.S. CAN-Spam Act [5] , and the Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Union [6] . Another option for refining the definition of spam is the requirement that "the transmission and reception of the message appears to the recipient to give a disproportionate benefit to the sender" [7] . This diversity of definition indicates a terminological fuzziness, which we are still facing in the spam discussion.
A second divergence arises when the emergence of spam is quantified and measured. Several market research institutions and security companies periodically publish data about spam specifying the total number and the proportion of spam emails. In addition to the various definitions of spam, methodological variations and different sample sizes are factors for (divergent) results [8] . For example, MessageLabs reports that, in June 2005, the proportion of spam reached 67.25 % [9] , however, Symantec announces the very different figure of 53% for the same month [10] .
Regardless of any precise definition and of the proportion of spam, private users' and companies' daily experience is that email communication is encumbered with a mass of email messages which their recipients have neither requested nor require. Even worse, the impacts of these messages are far from being simply an annoyance, as they also involve economic damage: The increased payload of networks and email servers, the consumption of employees' attention and time, fraud, and the spread of viruses, worms, and Trojan horses are just a few examples of the harm involved. The economic damage caused in total by spam emails is estimated at several billion US$ [11] .
Many different anti-spam measures have evolved and are deployed. Laws and regulations [12] , economic approaches, and technological measures [13] -including filters and authentication mechanisms -provide today's most important anti-spam leverages. They address three conditions, two of which must be fulfilled by bulk mailers (motivation and capability). The third condition refers to the legal permission some bulk mailers are grasping at in order to avoid litigation. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between anti-spam measures and both the intrinsic as well as the extrinsic factors for sending bulk email (which is legally allowed).
This manuscript examines the resource "email addresses" which is vital for any potential bulk mailer and spammer. Section 2 motivates the empirical analysis of the impact that placing email addresses on the Internet has on the receipt of spam, and frames the analysis' goals. Section 3 proposes a methodological framework for using a honeypot for the intended exploration. Section 
II. MOTIVATION, RECENT STUDIES, AND GOALS
Valid email addresses are among the most valuable resources for spammers, and the identification of address sources and spammers' exploiting procedures is crucial to preventing spammers from procuring addresses and subsequently misusing them. It is widely known that, besides generating addresses with brute force mechanisms and dictionary attacks, spammers procure valid email addresses by harvesting the Internet or, illegally, by purchasing or stealing them from various organizations. However, only little is known about the quantitative properties of email address abuse on the Internet and how to measure these. Gaining insight into this field allows for assessing the extent of the current harassment and its development over time and implicates the development of a test framework which also allows for measuring the effectiveness of address-obscuring techniques, such as the embedding of addresses into images or the "masking" of addresses textually, e.g. by using an address such as aliceREMOVETHISTEXT@wonderland.tv (see Section 6) . The framework's scope might also include the empirical assessment of such obfuscating techniques which restrict addresses' usability, e.g. by using single-purpose addresses [14] or email aliases [15] .
The author is aware of five empirical studies which focus on the extent of spam harm that is caused by placing email addresses on Internet services:
In 1999, the Australian Coalition Against Unsolicited Bulk Email (CAUBE.AU) seeded email addresses to the Usenet, to the web and to Internet contact databases. The study [16] , which took almost one year, focused on spam sources and contents. Regarding the attractiveness of particular services, the study found that " [ The FTC conducted a study [20] The studies differ in their goals as well as in their (methodological) framework and implementation, e.g. there are differences in the analysis periods, the number of seeded addresses, the number and kind of locations used, and the categories considered. This must be taken into account when comparing results.
All studies share the result that the extent to which email addresses are harvested and misused for spamming is considerable. This significance stresses the necessity of preventing or reducing the harvesting of email addresses placed on the Internet and motivates both the development of address-obfuscating techniques and (the deployment of a framework which supports) empirical studies which serve as a "controlling instrument".
The goals of this paper are (1) to propose a honeypot concept and a methodology which allows for the systematic implementation of an empirical analysis of the usage of email addresses that have been placed on the Internet, (2) to discuss important implementation issues by simultaneously presenting a pilot implementation, (3), by using statistical procedures, to present key findings of today's spam harassment which emanates from address placements on the Internet, and (4) to propose requirements for address obscuring techniques and to show to which extent today's most relevant techniques meet these requirements. The pilot study addresses issues such as the relative and absolute attractiveness of particular Internet services, the development of email addresses' attractiveness over time, the relevance of an email address' top level domain, differences in the seeding of addresses at languagespecific locations, and the relationship between the content of emails and the locations on which the recipients' addresses were placed.
The proposed "framework" is intended to be extensible to measuring the effectiveness of address-obscuring techniques.
III. METHODOLOGY AND HONEYPOT CONCEPTUALIZATION
The conceptualization and the methods used for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of a honeypot, which addresses the impact that placing email addresses on the Internet has on the receipt of spam, have to adhere, of course, to the honeypot objectives and questions to be answered. In addition to this, the collected emails provide a large data volume which is open to discovery of unknown patterns (data mining). This issue has to be especially considered in data modeling.
The conceptualization of the honeypot comprises the selection of appropriate Internet locations as well as email addresses to be seeded, the development of proper data and database models, and the selection and application of evaluation procedures.
Internet locations can be categorized by the use of the dimensions "service", "language", and "topic", as illustrated in figure 2.
Fig. 2. Categories of Internet locations
There is a broad range of services, which include email addresses and which are open to harvesters in principle [21] , such as web pages, chats, and newsgroups. Regarding the placement of email addresses, the services differ in many ways. For example, web pages permissively allow the seeding of textual email addresses as well as addresses which are embedded in a graphic (here referred to as the "representation form" of an email address), whereas newsletters and mailing lists are limited to textual addresses, and administrators of some newsgroups do not permit the placement of email addresses in the body of an article at all. A further dimension is spanned by the languages and countries involved in the empirical study. The Internet locations can also be categorized according to the topic they are dedicated to. The classification of web pages and newsletter/mailing lists, for example, can follow any e-business classification (possible topics are "education", "auctions", "logistics" etc.). Newsgroups can be classified according to the topics they are dedicated to and which are reflected in the newsgroup's name. Depending on the study's objectives, it might be desirable to define the topics service-specifically. After defining the categories for address placement, one or several locations per category can be selected. Finally, the type of addresses to be seeded has to be defined. This relates to the email addresses' top-level domain as well as to the representation form of the address. In order to trace back spam emails, it is necessary to use unique email addresses which are, ideally, invisible to users and thus transparent to harvesters only.
Emails can be stored in a flat file or in a database, the latter facilitating data analysis. If a database is selected as storage, then it should be noted that the data and database model decisively affect the analysis options and the time which evaluation procedures take. For example, if an email's envelope is discarded, its "MAIL FROM" parameter might be lost, or the storage of the body of an email as a binary large object (BLOB) does not allow an (efficient) determination of the email's multipurpose Internet mail extension (MIME) structure. The provision of a reference data model is desirable but beyond the scope of this work.
Although the selection of the evaluation procedures depends on the study's goal it might also be desirable to provide a methodological framework. This is likewise beyond the scope of this paper. However, section V (empirical results) presents some analysis methods and particularities which were respectively used and taken into consideration when evaluating the data on the honeypot's pilot implementation.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
This section describes the implementation and the exemplary application of the honeypot (conceptualization). Services included are US as well as German "web pages" and "newsletters", and German-speaking as well as Englishspeaking "Usenet groups". The topics of the first two services are listed in [22] , which also presents some preliminary results. The topics and names of the 21 Usenet groups are listed in the appendix.
A mail server has been set up, namely charlie.winfor.rwth-aachen.de, and three domains have been reserved -wforasp.com, wforasp.net, and wforasp.org -for covering the email addresses of four top level domains. All emails addressed to these domains are directed to this mail server. As thousands of email addresses had to be created, they were generated automatically by using a random generator for the user part of the addresses. In order to prevent email addresses from being guessed or generated with brute force attacks, it is necessary to define them randomly as well as to give them an appropriate number of characters. An example of an email address created in this way is wasp10208@wforasp.com.
The Internet locations serving as lures were chosen manually just as the placement of the email addresses had to be implemented manually. As soon as an email address is spread, its location and activation date are stored.
All incoming emails are classified into regular emails (ham emails), e.g. regular newsletters or such containing comments 
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Chinese Mandarin Russian … China, Taiwan … … … from users of discussion forums, and spam emails. This procedure was mainly executed by humans but supported by a mail parser (written in PHP) which used increasing white lists and blacklists. A second task of the mail parser was to decompose each incoming email: all entries of the header and the content were analyzed, as was the (MIME) structure of the body. Next, the emails' elements are stored in a (MySQL) database broken down into spam and ham emails. As many spam emails are not RFC-compliant, the parser's robustness against RFC violations was one of the implementation goals. Figure 3 provides a survey of the implementation infrastructure.
Simple data analysis was undertaken by using SQL queries, whereas more complex procedures were conducted by the use of Microsoft Excel. The total number of emails received on the honeypot is 57,273, 47% (26,882) of which is spam. Of all spam emails received on the email server, 69.9% (18, 792) result from placements on the Internet (denoted as honeypot spam emails), whereas the others -directed to addresses which have never been generated and which have been placed nowhere, such as admin@wforasp.com -are due to spammers' guessing attempts, e.g. by the use of brute force or dictionary attacks. The number of placed email addresses and their respective residence periods underlying this evaluation differ between the Internet services; only emails received before January 31 2006, 12pm MET have been considered. The average time period for email addresses placed on the web is almost a year, as is the time period for addresses used for newsletter subscriptions. The time period related to newsgroup placements is approximately half of that. Table I shows some statistical details of the email addresses placed on the Internet services. Most honeypot spam emails result from web placements (62.3% of all honeypot spam emails), followed by spam caused by newsgroup placements (6.3%) and to newsletter subscriptions (1.27%). However, as the number of placed emails as well as their online time periods vary, these proportions do not precisely reflect the services' attractiveness for harvesters. To take these two issues into account, the number of emails received on each service is weighted by using the total number of online days of all emails placed on the corresponding service. Let The computation in (1) is time-invariant in that all online days are same weighted. Table II shows the results which indicate that web placements attract more than two-thirds (70%) of all honeypot spam emails, followed by newsgroup placements (28.6%) and newsletter subscriptions (1.4%) -the latter hardly leading to the receiving of spam emails.Language-specific proportions do not considerably differ from the proportions in total. The honeypot also allows for analyzing the relevance of email address' top-level domain (TLD) to receiving spam. Table  III shows the empirical data. Proportions do not have to be weighted according to online days, because, at each Internet location, one address of each TLD was placed at the same time. , the null hypothesis has to be rejected on significance level 0.01. Therefore we cannot assume the proportions to be uniformly distributed.
Interestingly, the empirical data regarding spam on email addresses which were not placed on the Internet differ from the data considered above, in that spam emails directed to "org" addresses amount to almost 85%. Brute force and dictionary attacks seem to focus on email addresses with the TLD "org".
When we look at the extent to which email addresses placed on the web have been flooded with spam, we find that more than 43% of addresses on the web have been abused, whereas about 27% was the case for addresses on newsgroups and only about 4% for addresses used for a newsletter subscription. Table IV illustrates detailed data about this issue. The service instances, i.e. the names of websites, newsgroups and newsletters, where those email addresses were placed, which attracted most spam emails, are listed in the appendix together with the respective number of spam emails received.
The development of email addresses' attractiveness for spammers over time (see figure 4) can be analyzed by regression analysis; weeks without spam emails were omitted. We find a negative linear relationship for the service "web sites" with a coefficient of determination r 2 of approximately 0.86. The Pearson coefficient r is approximately -0.93, which strongly indicates a negative linear relationship. Assuming a negative exponential relationship for the service "newsgroups", we get a coefficient of determination of approximately 0.87. Performing a logarithmic transformation of the data, we again look for a negative linear relationship. The Pearson coefficient of the transformed data is approximately -0.96, which, then, finally supports strongly the assumption of a negative exponential relationship of the original data. A regression analysis for the service "newsletter" does not appear to be reasonable due to the low number of spam emails received.
The honeypot also allows for checking the relationship between a spam email's topic and the topic of the location at which the recipient's address was placed. We manually checked 3,500 spam emails in "first come first served" order 
VI. THE PERTINENCE OF ADDRESS OBSCURING TECHNIQUES
Address obfuscating/obscuring techniques (AOTs) belong to those technological anti-spam measures that aim at protecting email addresses from being automatically harvested, and thus addresses spammers' technological capabilities (see Figure 1 ). These measures are not meant to be deployed as a substitute for other technological anti-spam measures, such as those using filters or authentication mechanisms. Rather, their implementation is intended to be complementary to that of other measures. In contrast with many other technological antispam approaches, AOTs are primarily targeted at the prevention of sending spam emails and not at their detection. The detection of spam emails always entails that (1) sending process has been initiated or even almost completed and (2) resources, such as network bandwidth and detection software, have already been consumed. Therefore, prevention-oriented measures deserve closer attention from researchers as well as Internet organizations, email service providers, and users.
As spammers rely on large sets of valid email addresses, these have to be harvested automatically, either by the spammers or by address suppliers (if we ignore brute force and dictionary attacks, which are inevitable anyway). Previous studies and the empirical study conducted here show the large extent to which email addresses that have been placed on the Internet are (automatically) identified and consecutively misused for spamming.
In order to get an idea of how easy the harvesting of email addresses actually is, on one PC (Pentium 4, CPU 3GHz, RAM 1GB, Windows XP, Service Pack 2) we ran two harvesting tools: one for scanning the web, the other for scanning newsgroups. With regard to the web, we used the shareware "EmailSpider Gold 9.0" with the following (default) basic configuration: starting domain = www.yahoo.com, only scan super domains = com; the advanced configuration was modified by setting the number of parallel scan threads to 50 only. We terminated the search after 16 hours, by when we had obtained about 154,000 email addresses (multiple occurrences included), thus reaping an average of 9,625 addresses per hour. Assuming a linear relationship between the number of harvested email addresses and time, we would need about 1,039 hours or about 43.3 days of total computer time in order to collect 10,000,000 email addresses. As a search can be performed in parallel, the usage of n PCs reduces the total time by 1/n. With regard to newsgroups, we used the shareware "Power Email Extractor 4.1" and its (default) news server "freetext.usenetserver.com". We scanned 1,055 newsgroups that were related to computer issues, i.e. all comp.* newsgroups and received about 1 million addresses within 28 minutes. These addresses are promising in terms of their attractiveness for computer advertisers. The scanning of all "de"-newsgroups (593 newsgroups) took 30 minutes and resulted in about 1.2 million email addresses. These addresses are likely, owing to the "de" country suffix, to belong to German-speaking users, and therefore, these addresses are promising in terms of their attractiveness for German-speaking advertisers. We further scanned all 46,623 newsgroups on this particular server and obtained more than 12.5 million email addresses within about 15 hours. However, the email address pools still contained duplicates. Although we did no quantitative analysis -the reason for this being that we would have had to purchase the software for performing such an analysis -we believe the duplicate factor to be smaller than 10. These experiments demonstrate how quickly and with how few resources email addresses can actually be harvested.
Both the demonstrated ease of harvesting email addresses and results from empirical studies indicate a strong need for the protection of addresses. However, such a remedy does not seem to be straightforward, because we assume that AOTs have to address the following requirements in order to be effective in the long run:
R1. Addresses must still be recognizable and usable for humans. R2. Email communication (processes) must not become complex. R3. All locations from which harvesters can easily collect addresses have to be covered, i.e. it is insufficient to protect email addresses on the web while address books and email folders on local PCs remain open to harvesting malware. Raz [21] presents a list of potential email address pools. R4. Services, such as mailing lists, that require the automatic processing of valid email addresses, need appropriate support for the processing of obscured addresses. R5. The automatic recognition of valid email addresses must be difficult enough to ensure an effective protection. The difficulty can either rely on today's practical incapability of programs to recognize email addresses or on the computational effort that is necessary for recognition. However, the former approach involves considerable uncertainty about the duration of protection, so that the implementation of AOTs is in danger of causing an "arms' race" with harvesters. R6. Given that an obscured email address has been harvested and abused for spamming purposes, the concerned user should not be compelled to provide a new address to all of his/her contacts. We denote this requirement as robustness against harvesting.
Email addresses can be simply obscured by modifying or adding characters, examples are schryen+gmx.net, schryen(at)gmx.net, and schryenREMOVETHIS@gmx.net. Such AOTs work on a textual level only and can, hence, be used at any email address location. Another option for obscuring an email address is the modification of its representation/coding. For example, the ASCII representation of the address schryen@gmx.net in a web document is &#115;&#99;&#104;&#114;&#121;&#101;&#110;& #64;&#103;&#109;&#120;&#46;&#110;&#101;&#1 16;
The modification of the coding limits the applicability of the particular AOT to those environments that allow an appropriate processing of the representation. Another (web) environment-specific AOT is the integration of comments that are not displayed, for example, the line schryen<!-This text is intended to confuse harvesters. -->@gmx.net in an HTML document would result in the displaying of the actual email address. Environment-specific AOTs can work more sophisticatedly by using script languages, either on the client side or on the server side. This example illustrates the usage of the (client-side) script language JavaScript:
<script language="JavaScript"> <!--document.write ("<a href=\"mailto:" + "schryen" + "@" + "gmx.net\">email</a>");
The following example shows the usage of both client-side JavaScript and server-side PHP script that uses Base64 decoding (http://www.lakebase.com): <script type="text/javascript"src="http://www.lake base.com/jsmailer.php?v=TVRFMk1UQXhNVEV3Tk RZPU1USXdNVEE1TVRBek5qUT1NVEV3TVRBeE1USXhN VEUwTVRBME9Uaz1NVEUx&l=TVRBNE1UQTFPVGM9TVR BNU5qaz0="></script> Some users obscure their email address by replacing the textual address by an image that contains the address. This approach is motivated by the fact that the human brain is much better at visual processing than even powerful computers are (see [23] and [24] , which present Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) algorithms).
The sketched approaches have the advantage of being easy to implement and of not complicating email communication processes (requirement 2). Furthermore, they are still recognizable for human users (requirement 1). The extent to which the obscured addresses are appropriate for automatic processing (requirement 4) depends on the particular AOT in use. Most approaches are intended to be applied on the web, therefore, they are limited in their deployment in other email storages (requirement 3). What all approaches have in common is that they hide the method by which the addresses are being obscured. Once the method becomes known to the public, a new method has to be chosen and implemented, which results in additional efforts. As early as 1883, this principle was already regarded as inadequate in the context of cryptology (Kerckhoffs' principle, [25] ): a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge. In contrast to this principle, which follows the idea of "security by design", the proposed methods are based on "security by obscurity", thus violating requirement 5. Obscured email addresses are not designed to work as recipient-specific addresses. This missing property leads to a lack of robustness against harvesting (requirement 6).
Another group of AOT algorithms follows the "security by design" principle. Some of the most discussed ones are Hall's virtual channels [26] , extended email addresses as proposed by Gabber et al. [27] , single-purpose addresses introduced by Ioannidis [14] and the similar concept "Tagged Message Delivery Agent".
Hall proposed a virtual channel concept that is applied to selectively sharing email addresses, each of them being associated with one virtual channel. Essentially, each user's email account is made accessible via a user-controlled set of channels. Each channel has a distinctly structured address which contains within it the account name and a cryptographically secure, i.e. unguessable, pseudorandom security string, known as a channel identifier. Each legitimate correspondent is allowed to know one of these channel addresses. The account owner is provided with simple controls for opening a new channel, closing a channel, and switching a channel by notifying selected correspondents of a new channel that is replacing the current one. A channelized address is an email address of the form Username-ChannelID-@Host, e.g. alice-1xyz6u9uz4-@wonderland.com. The channel ID contains a channel class indicator (1) and a security string (xyz6u9uz4). The security string is built by generating 45 bits pseudorandomly and using "Base32" encoding to form 9 characters. If, for example, an email user wants to share 2 7 = 128 channels, an adversary has one chance in 2 (about 275 billion) of correctly guessing an open channel with one message. The channel class indicator consists of one digit. This digit allows differentiation between a send-only channel, which is useful when one wants to send a message to a public address without receiving emails at this address (i.e. permanently closed to everyone), a private channel, which is open to emails from pre-determined senders (emails from other persons may be ignored on such a channel), and a public channel (permanently open to everyone). Hall proposes an even richer class system: The maintenance of channels, i.e. generating, distributing, deleting etc.) is intended to be handled by a "Personal Channel Agent". For the sake of effective email address protection, it is essential to keep channel identifiers secret. However, this requirement seems more than challenging in a world where many PCs are infected with malware that can read the entries of their local address books.
Gabber et al. suggest a similar concept which is based on extended email addresses and also aims at hiding them. An extended email address for Alice would be Alice+xV78Yjkpl9@wonderland.com with xV78Yjkpl9 being the extension; the address alice@wonderland.com is denoted as the "core address". The extension will be calculated as e(Alice@wonderland.com,Bob@jungle.com;n Bob ) with e being a function which is not specified but described in terms of requirements and n Bob being a user-specific counter (with the initial value 0). Each time Bob gets a new extended address -maybe because the current address has been incautiously forwarded by Bob to someone else or it has been read by an address harvester -the counter is incremented by 1. In contrast with Hall's concept, an email address is bound to a specific user. When Alice gets an email from a user claiming to be Bob and to an address with extension e´, then Alice checks whether e´ = e(Alice@wonderland.com,Bob@jungle.com; n Bob ). If e´ ≠ e, the address is non-genuine and Alice has different options on how to proceed. One option is to accept this email if the sender belongs to a set of users who may be allowed to use this address, maybe because they are friends of Bob. Another option would be to reject the email and ask the sender to apply for an extended email address. To get such an address, the inquirer is involved in a payment-based procedure which might be CPU-based [28] , for example. While a single user can perform this challenge-response procedure easily, a spammer would be forced to do millions of handshakes. This approach faces the problem of having to hide email addresses, too. Furthermore, extended email addresses built this way are far removed from being guessable. To create an email address (circumventing any resource-consuming challenge-response procedure) which can be used by Bob to send emails to Alice, an adversary or spammer respectively needs to know the function e, Alice's and Bob's core addresses, and Alice's counter n Bob ). As a matter of cryptographic principle, the keeping of secrets should not rely on the algorithm used, so that e would be known or easily guessable. Alice's and Bob's core addresses are public data. In most cases, the counter, although not being public and only stored on Alice's side, would be easily guessable, as Alice is not believed to have very often created a new extended email address to be used by Bob. Thus, the counter should be a value of between 0 and, let's say, 10.
The concept of Ioannidis's Single-Purpose Address (SPA) goes even slightly further. It, too, addresses cases in which it is irrelevant whether an address is simple and readable (e.g., schryen@winfor.rwth-aachen.de, or completely obscure (e.g. VP72W24KM7IH7FT4O@winfor.rwthaachen.de) and where it is important to be able to limit the use of an address to only those purposes for which it was issued. The concept is both to prevent a party from sending advertising material in the future (which most online vendors do, despite their assurances to the contrary), and to prevent abuse of the supplied address by third parties who, with or without the cooperation of the merchant, acquire our email address. This is achieved by encoding rules as part of the email addresses in such a way that the potential senders cannot alter these rules without, at the same time, invalidating the alias. These address-specific rules are applied when an email has been sent to a particular address. This way, the user does not have to store any per-address rules locally or keep track of multiple email addresses, which rules out the problem of the size of the alias list and the size of filtering rules growing without bound. The SPA consists of two parts: an indication of the addressee, and an appropriately encoded description of the policy that will be applied when the message is received. The addressee can simply be identified by his or her username, with the policy part given as the extension, as in a "user+extension" convention. Since, presumably, the "naked" (with no extension) main address of the user would still be valid, it is recommended that users who want to use SPAs acquire a second address, and set up their systems so that mail to the naked second address is rejected. The creation of the second part of the SPA proceeds as follows (the parenthesized details refer to the author's prototypic implementation): The encoding results in a bit-oriented representation of the rule (112 bit representation), its hash (MD5, 16 bit) or even MAC value is generated and added resulting in a structure called "SPA block" (128 bit representation). Only in the case of a MAC being generated, using a user-specific (symmetric) key, will the SPA block be user-specific. 2. The SPA block is encrypted under a symmetric key (256 bit AES-key in CBC mode) known only to the user creating the SPA. 3. The output of the encryption is a string of randomlooking bits and, as such, it is not suitable for use as an email address. It must, therefore, be encoded (Base32 encoding) by using a set of characters that are legal for email addresses. The resulting string forms the second part of the SPA and is called SPABEE (SPA block encoded and encrypted). Figure 5 summarizes the process of generating a SPABEE. The address of an SPA email can either be checked by the receiving MTA or by the MDA. The processing has to be done in reverse order, as described. Thus, the processing node needs to have both the symmetric user-specific key for decoding and the email address that the email was sent to. This address is given in the RCPT command that an MTA has access to, but if an MUA is intended to process the SPA, any of the MTAs involved in email delivery must put this information in the header, e.g. in a "Received:" header line. The "user" part of the SPA address is used for identifying the recipient and the corresponding key for decrypting. The decoded and decrypted SPABEE gives a binary representation which is checked up on being a valid SPAB. This is the case if, and only if, the hash value or MAC corresponds to the binary representation of the rule encoded. If not, the address is not a valid SPA-address and the email will be discarded. Otherwise, the SPAB is decoded, then the email is checked against this policy and, subsequently, the MTA or MUA either delivers it, bounces it, or discards it accordingly. Compromising the system is possible if an attacker gets the symmetric key either from an unprotected key store or thanks to a successful cryptanalysis. A further attack is to create a SPABEE which represents, after decryption, a valid SPAB. However, this means the generation of a bit sequence that represents, following its decryption, a valid SPAB, i.e., a valid encoded rule and a compliant hash value or MAC. Thus, the deployed algorithms and key lengths have to be chosen appropriately, making these attacks negligible. Like the other obscuring approaches, the protection of users' local address books may remain an unsolved problem.
Furthermore, a legitimate first-contact communication via email is complicated because the sender has no means of easily procuring an SPA. Consequently, this approach suffers from the same limitations and drawbacks as does Hall's approach.
Tagged Message Delivery Agent (TMDA) (http://tmda.net) also uses the concept of using the email address to create SPAs. Aside from formatting and implementation details, the main architectural difference is that policy is not explicitly described in the email address, but rather that the address is used to look up the policy in local tables. This means that, for each special address created, policy must be kept so that it can be processed in the future, causing such policy tables to grow without bound when addresses without expiration dates are used.
The presented "security by design" approaches make email addresses difficult to use for humans and, dependent on their particular approach, make email communication more complex (violation of requirements 1 and 2, respectively). The extent to which addresses are protected against harvesting in other email address pools, such as local email directories (requirement 3), depends on a particular approach and its implementation. For example, a "Hall" address, which is stored unencryptedly, can be read and used by any sender. Likewise, a user-specific counter of a "Gabber" address must not be stored unencryptedly. As long as all addresses are textual addresses that need not to be processed by an application, such as a script interpreter, the automatic processing of such obscured addresses is possible (requirement 4). The "security by design" principle, which is inherent in the presented approaches, relies on (mathematical) complexity. Thus, we can use (complexity) theory in order to assess the level of security thereby circumventing an "arms's race" with harvesters (requirement 5). These approaches also provide means for sender-specific email addresses, so requirement 6 is met. Table V provides a glance of the matching between requirements and proposed approches. Looking at AOTs, we face the known trade-off between security and ease of use (pragmatics). However, we believe "security by design" approaches to be more promising and long-term effective than "security by obscurity" ones are. The effectiveness of any implemented AOTs should be tested continuously and empirically, for example by the usage of our proposed framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
The empirical results of the study presented in this paper confirm the findings of previous studies, i.e. that particularly web pages and Usenet groups belong to the most vulnerable Internet spots regarding email address harvesting. Although the detected extents to which addresses were misused for spamming differ from each other, Internet locations are still a very attractive and heavily exploited source for address harvesters. In order to hamper spammers in easily procuring email addresses from the Internet at low expense, it seems worthwhile to further elaborate on address obscuring techniques, which fulfill the proposed requirements, in order for these to be effective in the long run. Their deployment is intended to be used complementarily to other anti-spam techniques and should be continuously accompanied by honeypot-based studies which allow the measuring of their practical effectiveness. The honeypot conceptualization and the methodology presented in this paper can serve as a basis for these studies. 
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